Abstract
Revenue-optimal auction design has been a topic of intensive research over the past decade. The problem is formulated as designing a revenue-maximizing mechanism for a seller who sells k items to n buyers with the knowledge of the buyers’ valuation distributions rather than the actual values. Myerson has solved the case of selling one item. In multi-item auctions, the closed-form characterization of the optimal mechanism is still open, even for relatively simple continuous distributions. In this talk, we develop novel geometric methods that allow us to obtain structural and closed-form characterizations of optimal mechanisms for cases where the seller has two items for sale.Time
2016-06-16 10:00 ~ 11:00Speaker
Zihe Wang,Institute for Interdisciplinary Information Sciences(IIIS),Tsinghua UniversityRoom
Room 308, No.100 Wudong Road, School of Information Management & Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
