Facility Location Games: From Origin to Recent Development (Minming Li)

Abstract

Mechanism Design, as one of the important areas in algorithmic game theory, can be classified into two categories: with money and without money. Facility location game is one of the mostly studied problem in mechanism design without money. Procaccia and tennenholtz proposed and studied the problem back in 2009, where there are n agents on a line and the government will build a facility in a certain location given the agents reported information on their positions. Since every agent wants the facility to be closer to her, the government wants to make sure truth-telling is the best strategy for every agent while achieving some optimization objective. Since then, some bounds on the approximation ratios of the truthful mechanisms have been improved and new models are proposed. In this talk, we will briefly explain the story of the classic model and emphasize on the recent development on new models proposed by us and other groups.

Time

2017-08-23  14:00 ~ 15:00   

Speaker

Minming Li, City University of Hong Kong

Room

Room 602,School of Information Management & Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics